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Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070007-5

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DD/A Registry
File Security

Director of Security

Atts: DDA 78-0870, -/1

Will you please have your appropriate officer start to familiarize himself with the attached package. We are planning a course of action to have the Security Committee transferred over here sometime after the 14th of March. The attached matter will obviously have to receive early-on consideration.

/s/ Jack

John F. Blake

Deputy Director for Administration

6 Mar 78

DDA:JFBlake:kmg (6 Mar 78)

Distribution:

Orig RS - D/Sec w/atts

X - DDA Subj w/atts

1 - DDA Chrono w/DDA 78-0870/1

1 - JFB Chrono " "

DDA 78-0870/1

6 March 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: John F. Blake
Deputy Director for Administration

Stan:

1. As you will recall, it was agreed at our session at the [] that the Security Committee would move from the IC Staff to me. I have taken no visible action on this matter as yet because it is my understanding that you will be briefing the NFIB on 14 March on various community organizational matters. I did not want to get out in front of you on this matter. The same reasoning holds for having taken no action on establishing the additional title "Deputy to the DCI for Support." Once your 14 March briefing is accomplished, we will proceed on both matters.

2. I write you this note at this time because, in connection with your signing a memo to General Tighe on "Security Compartmentation," you appended the following note:

"Did we not assign Security Committee to Jack & isn't he the best one to take charge & march off--he's neither a collector or producer?"

I have discussed my approach on this matter with [] and he is in agreement to keeping the Security Committee until shortly after 14 March.

/s/ Jack

John F. Blake

Distribution:

- Orig - DCI
- 1 - DDCI
- 1 - ER
- 1 - D/DCI/RM
- 1 - D/Sec w/ref
- 1 - DDA Subj w/ref (DDA 78-0870)
- 1 - DDA Chrono

Ref: Memo dtd 2 Mar 78 to DDCI,
D/DCI/RM and DDA fr ES, subj:
Security Compartmentation

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DD/A Registry

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78-4807/2

2 March 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy to the Director for Resource Management
Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT : Security Compartmentation

1. In reviewing the attached package from the Acting Chairman of the Security Committee and signing off on the accompanying letter to Director, DIA, General Tighe, the Director wrote the following note to each of you:

"Did we not assign Security Committee to Jack & isn't he the best one to take charge & march off--he's neither a collector or producer?"

2. By this memorandum I am asking Messrs. Blake and [redacted] to consult and advise the DCI via DDCI.

[redacted]
B. C. Evans
Executive Secretary

Attachment
As stated

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

SECOM-D-306
27 January 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR:

[redacted]
Executive Secretary, NFIB

FROM:

[redacted]
Acting Chairman

SUBJECT:

Security Compartmentation [redacted]

REFERENCE:

DCI/IC 78-5006, dated 12 January 1978, subject:
Proposed DCID on Compartmentation

1. [redacted] This responds to your request (reference) for an identification of issues and problems bearing on compartmentation, and a description of who is doing what about them.

2. [redacted] As you noted, General Tighe's recent memorandum soliciting DCI support for early NFIB action on a proposed DCID on compartmentation is but one of several recent expressions of concern from Defense about the pace of pending actions on compartmentation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff brought up the subject for discussion during their 20 January 1978 meeting with the DCI.

3. [redacted] The proposed compartmentation DCID derives from a 1976 initiative by Defense, presented as a means of redressing the balance between protection and utility of intelligence information. That initiative was referred to the Security Committee. Sharp divisions in the Community have stalled action at our level on trying to develop a directive establishing clear policies on what should be compartmented and effective procedures for doing so. Those with a "collection" orientation generally favor the status quo, under which the DCI collection committees or program managers both assert what needs to be compartmented and develop the protective measures they deem appropriate. Those with a "user" orientation want a change which would provide a better balance between a collector's assertions on restrictive security measures and the users' needs to get the collected information in a manner which permits its full and timely application. The "users" generally view present arrangements as institutionalizing a bias in favor of strict protection and unreceptive to Community needs for access under readily manageable conditions.

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SUBJECT: Security Compartmentation

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A majority on the Security Committee sought to attain this improved balance through having the proposed DCID make the Committee itself responsible for determining what needs to be compartmented. A copy of their proposed DCID is attached for information (see Attachment A). The Committee Staff, believing that neither it nor the Committee as a collegial body has the technical expertise to make such a determination, proposed a different approach without much success. That approach is that: (1) those intimately knowledgeable of the collection environment propose information elements for compartmentation; (2) the Security Committee comment on the feasibility of protecting the information at both compartmented and non-compartmented classified levels; (3) Community agencies with interests in using the information comment on the impact the compartmentation proposal would have on their responsibilities; (4) a senior staff advisor to the DCI review these inputs from an overall Community point of view and recommend a balanced position to the DCI for final approval; and (5) the Security Committee play the leading role in developing the administrative procedures to apply the DCI's decision.

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4. The slow pace of action on the proposed compartmentation DCID is unfortunately paralleled in other actions underway which bear on compartmentation in some manner. Some of the delay is due to the complexity of the subject and to the need for wide-ranging coordination. In other cases, different problems have contributed to slow action. In any event, the lack of much in the way of specific accomplishment fuels the concerns expressed by DIA. Significant pending actions bearing on compartmentation include:

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a. Simplification of security policy for space intelligence matters. A proposal on this was developed by an ad hoc Community group convened by the DCI in January 1976. Specific recommendations were sent to the President by the DCI in November 1976, but were held over and subsumed in the space policy review (PRM-23). The security recommendations from that are very close to the November 1976 ones, but are not yet final pending further consideration of the draft Presidential Directive. Until this is acted upon, no changes can be made in the system of security controls for intelligence satellite product. The Security Committee staff provided support on security issues involved in this effort.

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b. Revision of Executive Order 11652 on security classification. The new draft Order developed in response to PRM-29 will require, among other things, that intelligence compartments be continued or established only upon personal DCI approval after consideration of the balance between protection and use and assessment of attendant security factors. Compartments will also be subject to periodic

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SUBJECT: Security Compartmentation

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review requirements leading to cancellation, change, or re-affirmation. A mechanism to support the DCI in these regards is needed. A Security Committee staff member participated in the PRM-29 effort and was one of the drafters for the new Order.

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*Must do
ASAP*

c. Central computer data base to record and manage compartmented accesses. The NFIB concurred in a concept for such (the 4C's System) in 1975, but disagreement on funding precluded implementation; funding is still an issue. Further examination of the concept suggests that its management benefits are well worth the cost. The Security Committee is staffing a new proposal on this system for DCI consideration.

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d. Uniform administrative system for compartmented data. The Security Committee developed, and the NFIB has for comment, a proposed DCID to bring all administrative procedures for handling and controlling such data together into one regulation. Some agency comments on the proposal counsel delay until the new Executive Order on security classification is approved.

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e. Updating of Community security policy on travel and assignment of persons with compartmented access. Strong Community differences on the subject have delayed decision. Legal issues were raised and explored. The Security Committee has developed, and the NFIB has for comment, an up-to-date proposed DCID on this matter. Comments show that Community differences will have to be resolved by DCI decision.

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f. Updating of the TALENT-KEYHOLE Manual. COMIREX has completed a several-year-long effort to draft a revision of the manual, consolidating all existing provisions bearing on T-K matters, and will shortly seek DCI approval for the changes involved.

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g. Updating of the Communication Intelligence Security Regulations. The SIGINT Committee has been working for about a year on a draft revision of this directive. More review and coordination is needed.

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5. A factor that does not contribute to timely action on security matters is the division of responsibility for the subject, both by directive and by practice. With regard to compartmentation:

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a. DCID 1/11, the Security Committee's charter, assigns a mission to "review special security and compartmentation

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SUBJECT: Security Compartmentation ☐

25X1

procedures and develop proposals for any necessary changes to achieve optimum use of intelligence consistent with protection of sensitive intelligence sources and methods." Notwithstanding that, a recent proposal to subdivide a ☐ compartment into two separate ones was not assigned to the Security Committee for action.

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b. ☐ COMIREX, which is primarily responsible for advising on the collection, processing, and exploitation of imagery, is also tasked by its charter (DCID 1/13) to develop "special security-control" procedures for imagery product. They, not the Security Committee, develop the administrative directives specifying how such product is to be protected.

25X1

c. ☐ The SIGINT Committee, which is primarily responsible for advising on the collection and use of SIGINT, is tasked by its charter (DCID 6/1) to study and prepare recommendations on the "degree and type of security protection" to be afforded SIGINT and on associated administrative procedures.

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d. ☐ An ad hoc group, not the Security Committee, was tasked last year to review security and compartmentation from an overall Community standpoint and to develop implementation plans for improvements. This, the Senior Security Study Group, was set up in response to a suggestion by the then Director, DIA, who believed that such would accelerate the pace of meaningful action on compartmentation.

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6. ☐ Both policy and practice show that the DCI does not have a single focal point for Community security policy matters, as opposed to a single security advisor for operational security matters bearing on CIA. The concerns increasingly voiced by Defense are of Community character. They appear to seek an institutional approach which would give both the substance and the appearance of balanced consideration of the competing parochial interests of separate Community entities. Some arrangement to that effect will be needed to comply with the revision of E.O. 11652, which will require the protective features of present and proposed compartments to be balanced against the "full spectrum of needs to use the information" involved. It would seem that that balance would not be served by permitting either collectors or consumers to have a preponderant role in recommending security policy. Both have to contribute to the process, because no one else can speak with their experience and technical knowledge. But someone without a vested interest in the outcome should be closely involved in the balancing process and in the follow-through administration after the DCI has made his decision.

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SUBJECT: Security Compartmentation [REDACTED]

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7. [REDACTED] Attached for your consideration is a suggested reply (Attachment B) for the DCI to send General Tighe. It states a plan to schedule an NFIB discussion on compartmentation, on the assumption that the DCI would believe such necessary and desirable. If the DCI concurs in such an approach, we will prepare a talking paper for his use.

25X1A



Attachments:

- A. Proposed DCID on Compartmentation
- B. DCI Memo to D/DIA

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NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

2 March 1978

Executive Registry

78-4807/A

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lieutenant General Eugene F. Tighe, Jr.,
USAF
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Security Compartmentation ☐

25X1

REFERENCE: S-8334-RSS-4B, dated 3 January 1978,
subject: Proposed DCID on
Compartmentation

25X1

☐ Your memorandum (see reference) raises some valid points about the progress of various actions bearing on security compartmentation. The proposed compartmentation DCID you noted is but one of several draft directives on this general subject which require resolution. Since the delays in coming to grips with these issues seem to reflect underlying philosophical differences in the Community on how to deal with the need for and impact of compartmentation, I plan to schedule an NFIB discussion on the subject on 14 March. That should help us determine what organizational arrangements and assignments of responsibility we will need to balance the full range of Community interests in the protection and use of sensitive intelligence.


☐
STANSFIELD TURNER
Chairman

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

178-4802

3 JAN 1973

S-8334-RSS-4B

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Proposed DCID on Compartmentation (U)

1. (U) The purpose of this memorandum is to solicit your support so that early actions may be taken by the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) on the subject draft DCID.
2. (S) Various working groups involved have expended considerable time and effort in the development of this DCID. Review by the NFIB at this time would be in consonance with and supportive of SIGINT Committee revision of DCID 6/3 and the COMIREX rewrite of the TK manual. Both these on-going efforts would be enhanced by early approval of subject DCID.
3. (S) DIA continues to view the compartmentation question as one of the intelligence community's most vexing problems. DIA and the Services are working now within current guidelines to ensure maximum dissemination of intelligence to appropriate users without compromise of sensitive sources and methods. Your recent decision to develop an improved computerized data base is viewed as a forward step in maintaining the whole system of accesses to the various SCI compartments. It is believed that early resolution of the compartmentation issue would enhance responsiveness and dissemination of intelligence to major military commands worldwide.

EUGENE W. HALL, JR.
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

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Office of Legislative Counsel

OLC 78-0528/a

27 February 1978

C.384

XP 78.48

Mr. Thomas K. Latimer, Staff Director
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515


Dear Tom:

Reference is made to Chairman Boland's letter of 1 February 1978 concerning compartmented intelligence programs and your conversation with [] on this subject.

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We clearly understand and appreciate the concern in assuring that there is a proper balance between a requirement for specially compartmented clearances and the need for efficient use of intelligence information.

This is to confirm that a report is being prepared detailing a survey of all compartmented systems and including access lists for intelligence activities of which the Director is aware of or has cognizance, and every effort will be made to complete the report by the 1 April target date which was requested.



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Acting Legislative Counsel

Distribution:

Orig - Adsc

1 - ER

1 - IC Staff []

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OLC/PLC/ksn (22 Feb 78)

Retyped:LLM/baa (27 Feb 78)

Routing Slip

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	D/DCI/IC	X			
4	DDS&T				
5	DDI				
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	D/DCI/NI				
9	GC				
10	LC	X			
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/Pers				
14	D/S		X		
15	DTR				
16	A/DCI/PA				
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/IPS				
19	DCI/SS				
20					
21					
22					

SUSPENSE 20 March
Date

Remarks:

To 10: Per my call to [redacted] his office will take the lead in preparing this study, in concert with your office and the Office of Security.

2 Feb 78
Date

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NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

NFIB-9.2/60
13 February 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board

FROM:

[redacted]
Executive Secretary, National Foreign
Intelligence Board

SUBJECT: Sensitive Compartmented Information
(SCI) Policy [redacted]

1. [redacted] The attached memorandum from the Chairman is forwarded for your consideration.

2. [redacted] We are tentatively proposing 14 March as the date for NFIB to address the general subject of security of sensitive compartmented information. The meeting is likely to focus on, but need not be limited to, discussion of:

- a. The proposed DCID on Compartmentation;
- b. Administrative procedures for handling and controlling compartmented data;
- c. Policy on travel and assignment of persons with compartmented access;
- d. Proposed DCID 1/16 on Computer Security.

You are invited to forward to the Executive Secretary in advance of the meeting any general comments on the subject of compartmented information policy which you have not already made on one of the specific topics.

Attachment: a/s

Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 55(1), (2), (3)
Automatically declassified on
Date Impossible to Determine

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NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

9 February 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board

FROM: Stansfield Turner
Chairman

SUBJECT: Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Policy ☐

25X1

REFERENCES: A. NFIB-9.2/59, dated 12 July 1977
B. NFIB-M-703, dated 25 September 1975

25X1 1. ☐ After reviewing the Security Task Force Report on the Moore and Boyce/Lee cases, I instituted a number of actions aimed at improving security of sensitive compartmented information. My objective was to review current security practices and institute more stringent security controls. Over the past several months, specific problems have been identified and new security procedures have been instituted to correct them. This memorandum reviews this activity and recommends additional steps to further improve protection of sensitive information.

25X1 2. ☐ Several important actions have been taken to tighten industrial security. The industrial security program of the CIA has been bolstered by the addition of new industrial security officer positions. A program to conduct periodic unannounced security surveys and inspections of contract facilities has been implemented. A new procedure has been instituted that requires the presence of two individuals in sensitive areas such as the communications center and document control sections at industrial facilities. Action also has been taken to emphasize supervisory responsibilities aimed at identifying and dealing with personnel problems before they become security problems. I have asked for a comprehensive counterintelligence assessment to determine what additional steps should be taken in the industrial arena to tighten security in the face of the Soviet threat. NFIB principals should evaluate their own industrial security programs to assess their adequacy and effectiveness.

25X1 3. ☐ One major area of emphasis in the security review has been the management of sensitive compartmented information programs. Reviews by the Chairmen of the SIGINT Committee and COMIREX have indicated that the present procedures for accounting for personnel cleared for the various compartmented programs are inadequate, and that a concerted effort to provide centralized management is required. Work is underway in the Security Committee to develop a computerized management program designed to meet the needs of all agencies in the Intelligence Community. I will be advising the Board further on this program, its implications, and costs.

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SUBJECT: Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Policy ☐

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4. ☐ Last summer I placed a freeze on the number of personnel having access to special compartmented information by requiring that personnel coming into the system would be matched by personnel being debriefed. The objective was to stabilize the numbers of persons having access to SCI and to focus Community attention on the fact that the principle of need-to-know must be practiced. This procedure has caused some problems, but overall it has had a salutary effect. The number of personnel cleared for access to sensitive information has stabilized. More importantly, requests for new clearances have been given a more thorough scrub at all stages in the approval process. While I am aware that briefing personnel into compartmented programs facilitates security by making them conscious of the sensitivity of the information made available to them, I am resolved to continue this stabilization and eventually show a downward trend in the number of personnel cleared. Consequently, continued compliance with the principle of one in, one out is required. There will be instances when the one in, one out concept will not be practical, for example, when new programs are initiated. Such exceptions will be considered on a case-by-case basis and subject to my ultimate approval.

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5. ☐ The Chairmen of the SIGINT Committee and COMIREX are continuing to pursue the question of what materials and information now controlled in the COMINT and TALENT-KEYHOLE systems may be decompartmented so as to reduce the numbers of SCI access approvals.

25X1

6. ☐ While we have made some progress in improving security of sensitive information, considerably more remains to be done. I encourage each NFIB Principal to offer suggestions they may have on ways to improve the overall security of sensitive compartmented information. I intend to schedule an NFIB meeting to discuss this general subject soon.

25X1

☐
STANSFIELD TURNER

NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

IC-78-5018
13 February 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, National Foreign Intelligence Board

FROM:

[redacted]
Executive Secretary, National Foreign Intelligence Board

SUBJECT: Security Compartmentation [redacted]

1. [redacted] Action Requested: None, ~~the attached memoranda are for your information only.~~ *SEE LAST PAGE*

2. [redacted] Background: In view of the number of business items pending on fundamental security issues, we asked the Acting Chairman of the Security Committee, [redacted] to compile the attached status report. We think you will find it a useful listing; Cal also identifies the basic differences in the community as well as the lack of a single focal point to advise you on security policy.

3. [redacted] There is also a letter of 1 February from the Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to you expressing concern about the administration of compartmented systems. It is attached for your reference.

4. [redacted] While we were thinking of compartmented security as an important topic for NFIB consideration, apparently you were as well. When circulating your 9 February memorandum on the subject to the Board, we used the occasion to tentatively reserve the NFIB meeting of 14 March to address security issues. We informed the Board that discussion is likely to focus on, but need not be limited to:

SUBJECT: Security Compartmentation

25X1

- a. The Proposed DCID on Compartmentation;
- b. Administrative procedures for handling and controlling compartmented data;
- c. Policy on travel and assignment of persons with compartmented access;
- d. Proposed DCID 1/16 on Computer Security;

and invited general comments so they can be provided to you in advance of the meeting.

25X1 5. We proposed the 14 March meeting as an opportunity for you to receive the Board's advice on the subject; however, if instead you prefer to use the occasion to announce your security policy, the written comments we have invited may be of some assistance to you.

25X1 6. Earlier, before your memorandum to NFIB was circulated, the Security Committee drafted an interim response for you to send to General Tighe to advise him of your intention to schedule an NFIB meeting on the subject. Since you now have made that point to the entire Board, and we believe it is no longer necessary for you to send a separate note to General Tighe. Should you wish to do so, however, one has been updated and is attached for your consideration.

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Attachments: a/s

SUBJECT: Security Compartmentation

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Distribution:

IC 78-5018

Orig. Ch, NFIB

1 D/DCI/RM

1 Acting Ch, Security Com

1 Exec Sec, NFIB

1 ER

1 IC Registry

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NFIB/S//akk/13Feb78/

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